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Introduction   
 
This qualitative research has been implemented thanks to a joint fellowship granted by Eurasia 
Partnership Foundation and Caucasus Research Resource Centers. It examines contemporary 
youth gender and intergenerational relations and their impact on the process of democratization 
in Azerbaijan.  
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan following its independence in 1991 has taken the pledge of 
democracy and market economy. To this end, democratization, modernization and economic 
development are officially declared policy of the current Azerbaijani Administration. However, 
the devastating war in Upper Garabagh and surrounding regions with Armenia (1988-1994), the 
ongoing conflict situation since the 1994 ceasefire as well as intense geopolitical struggle over 
Baku oil have blurred and distracted attentions from democratic development from the start. 
Nevertheless, socio-cultural dimension is very important to consider in promoting, or hindering 
democracy along with political and geopolitical factors.  
 
The research hypothesis involved in this study contends that inequality in youth gender and 
intergenerational relations is one of crucial hindrances in the building of democratization in 
Azerbaijan. Socialization of the youth into conformity with a system of male dominance and 
gender inequality within the family and in the society at large promotes the authoritarian social 
and political system in the country, and hinders attempts at evolving democratic values and 
building democratic institutions. 
How Youth Gender and Intergenerational Relations Affect Democratization in Azerbaijan 
 
2 of 35 
1. Background  
 
Socio-cultural    
 
Azerbaijan is a post-Soviet-Muslim country. At present, it still bears Soviet legacies, on the one 
hand and on the other hand, faces the revival and reinvention of Muslim traditions. About 100 
years of Russian colonialism followed by over 70 years of Soviet regime repressed and 
eliminated generations of progressive Azeri intellectuals and leaders, and produced dependant 
and indifferent citizens easily manipulable by the ruling class. Though the post-Soviet period is 
often referred to as a transitional period it has in fact degenerated into a state of stagnation and 
inefficient governance. This arises from the older and middle generations‟ experience of the state 
interference and control, which inhibited individual initiative. This research examines the 
contemporary Azeri youth and their relations with opposite sex in the newly democratizing 
society. But, it is impossible to examine youth gender relations and ignore intergenerational 
relationships since they are closely related and often bear a symbiotic character in the 
patriarchal-hierarchical social context.    
 
In the ethnic Azeri culture, respect for the elders and obedience by the young are important 
features.
1
 This in practice leads to the rule of the elders. It continues to be valid as long as 
kinship ties and family dependence (familialism) are very strong in the society.
2
 The Azeri youth 
mostly live with their parents and sometimes the extended family, which is a Muslim-Soviet 
legacy and contributes to authoritarian-patriarchal characteristics of the society.
3
 As discussed 
for the Spanish society with its similarity of traditional family relations, living with the family 
serves as a means of survival strategy in the absence of a welfare state and benefit.
4
 Similarly, 
economic and emotional dependence on the family and elders disempowers the Azeri youth. 
Elders often make life decisions such as choice of profession, friends, marriage partner and 
travel on behalf of young people, especially the females. In the presence of controlling and 
protective parents younger people lack privacy, fail to develop independent agency, dedicate 
their life to meet elder‟s expectations and live in the world of their unfulfilled needs and wishes.5    
Another feature of Azeri culture is the strictly separated gender roles at home and in the public 
that perpetuate inequality among sexes.
 6
 Hierarchical power relations exist between male and 
female on the one hand, and between elders and youth on the other hand. It is not a social 
phenomenon unique to Azerbaijan, but also observed in Central Asia, Middle East, 
Mediterranean countries and Latin America.
7
 As argued by Colette Harris, it is the honour-and-
shame system that bears the chief responsibility for the similarity of social norms affecting 
women‟s conduct, and gender roles and relations across a wide geographic region.8 The notions 
of namus (female sexual honour), qeyrət (male honour or manliness) and ayıb (shame) control 
individual freedom and restrict personal goals not only for females but also males. They put the 
burden of the protection of female honour on male‟s shoulders. A minor deviance from publicly 
                                                 
1
 Heyat, Farideh. 2005. Azeri Women in Transition: Women in Soviet and Post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Baku, 
Chashioglu. 2
nd
 edition. p.8 
2
 Ibid. p.8,146 
3
 Ibid. p. 33-34, 105, 233-34  
4
 Minguez, Almudena M. 2003. The Late Emancipation of Spanish Youth: Keys for Understanding. Electronic 
Journal of Sociology. Found in: http://www.sociology.org/content/vol7.1/minguez.html  
5
 Heyat, Farideh. September, 2006. Globalization and Changing Gender Norms in Azerbaijan. International 
Feminist Journal of Politics. p.401-402 
6
 Report on Implementation of the CEDAW in Azerbaijan. 2005. Found in: http://scfwca.gov.az/docs/hesabat.doc  
p.25-26 (in Azeri, translation by this researcher)  
7
 Harris, Colette. 2004. Control and Subversion: Gender Relations in Tajikistan. London. Pluto Press. p. 88-89 
8
 Ibid. p.73  
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expected behavioral patterns threatens female‟s reputation and sometimes life and makes young 
male vulnerable to peer and elder‟s pressure. Male supremacy manifests itself in female 
obedience which leads to the lack of individual initiative and political and public activism among 
young females. As in the example of elections, male heads of family dictate whether and how 
female members should join election campaigns, and whom to favor and vote for.
9
 The 
traditional gender norms hinder female participants as both electorate and election candidate. 
According to the 2008 Human Right Report on Azerbaijan, there were 14 women in the 125-seat 
parliament. “Several women held senior government positions, including deputy speaker of 
parliament, several deputy ministers, and deputy chair of the Central Election Commission. 
There were no legal restrictions on the participation of women in politics, although traditional 
social norms limited women's political roles, and they were underrepresented in elective 
offices.”10   
One‟s age and gender along with social status and locality determines one‟s place in the Azeri 
society.
11
 Deterministic and authoritarian-patriarchal character of Azeri societal norms is 
explicitly reflected in samples of folklore known as atalar sözü (literally translated as fathers‟ 
words, equivalent of proverb). Fathers‟ words are often applied both by elders and youth as well 
as males and females for the reasons of justification and validation of one‟s actions and of 
comparison of other‟s degree of conformity to norms. Apparently, as a conventional-regulatory 
means for communal as well as interpersonal relations fathers‟ words came about in different 
times and regions, because they are often in contradiction with each other and sound out-dated. 
For instance, the one who ignores elder‟s advice will be left hollering (böyüyün sözünə 
baxmayan böyürə-böyürə qalar) or wisdom is not with age but in personality (ağıl yaşda deyil, 
başdadır), or lion is lion whether it is a male or female (aslanın erkəyi-dişisi olmaz), or cover in 
a carpet and creep with the countrymen (palaza bürün, el ilə sürün), or the one who learns in his 
40 will play in his grave (qırxında öyrənən gorunda çalar). But, newly emerging liberal-
democratic part of Azeri youth has started to question so-called mandate of fathers‟ words and 
juxtaposed them with sons‟ words (oğullar sözü)12. It predicates an aspect of the shift from 
traditionalism to liberalism among younger generation and reflects a widening intergenerational 
gap.  
At present, small numbers of the Azeri youth are highly exposed to Western culture through 
study and travel abroad. Differences between Azeri and Western cultures are so radical that 
interaction produces the effect of culture shock and becomes a challenge for an already formed 
traditional-national identity. However, internalization of Western/European values by Azeri 
youth depends on the length of interaction and degree of exposure as well as their age group. By 
2007 a few dozens of Azeri youth studied abroad at the expense of foreign, mainly Western and 
American fellowships/scholarships as a part of international development policy of those 
countries. That sector of Azeri youth either partly stayed abroad for better life choices or upon 
their return have been co-opted or assimilated in the society. In 2007 the Azeri Government 
launched the 2007-2015 State Program to support Azeri youth study abroad in response to 
increasing demand for Western-trained specialists. It will take some years for those students to 
return and make their contributions to the society, and it will also depend on the involvement of 
international community at a given time.  
                                                 
9
 During my employment with OSCE/ODIHR Long Term Observations teams (2005, 2008) as an 
Assistant/Interpreter, I had chance to observe election preparations and this phenomenon in Shamakhi and five 
surrounding regions, but my views do not reflect that of this organization.  
10
 2008 Human Rights Report: Azerbaijan. Feb. 25, 2009. Found in: 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119068.htm  
11
 A similarity is observed in the post-Soviet-Muslim Tajikistan. (Harris, 2004)  
12
 Official website of the OL youth movement. Found in: http://ol-az.blogspot.com  
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Azerbaijan has been arena for activities of many Western and pro-Western international 
organizations, non-government organizations (NGOs) and embassies since 1991. They influence 
and contribute to development directions and strategies in the country. United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), United Nations agencies including United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) have emphasized human rights including gender 
and women‟s issues in Azerbaijan. Even though international and foreign projects or programs 
did not translate into a significant enhancement of human rights, they have to some extent laid a 
ground for civil society and democratization, and acted as an arbiter between authorities and 
citizens as well as local NGOs.  
 
 
Theoretical  
 
On democracy Robert A. Dahl wrote: “It was the Greeks-probably the Athenians-who coined the 
term democracy, or demokratia, from the Greek words demos, the people, and kratos, to rule.” 13  
As criteria for democratic process, Dahl defined at least five standards including effective 
participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda, and inclusion of 
adults.   
 
According to Samuel P. Huntington, three waves of democratization have occurred in the 
modern world and the third wave is on the way since 1974. Huntington suggests: “At the 
simplest level, democratization involves: (1) the end of an authoritarian regime; (2) the 
installation of a democratic regime; and (3) the consolidation of the democratic regime.”14  
 
Azerbaijan joined the third wave of democratization after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 
1991. The status of democracy and level of democratization has been relatively studied by both 
foreign and local academia. Juviler (1998) concludes that Azerbaijan is a pseudo-democracy; 
maintaining the façade of democratic institutions and practices which are in fact powerless, 
while ignoring the law and citizen rights.
15
 Cornell (2001) asserts that Azerbaijan is neither a 
democracy nor a clear-cut authoritarian state.
16
 Zbignew Brzezinski (2001) classifies the fifteen 
post-Soviet states into three categories such as (1) moving toward sustainable democracy (Baltic 
States); (2) nominal democracy (Central Asian states, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova, Belarus); 
and (3) regimes with ambiguous nature (the rest of the post-Soviet republics).
17
 Marina Ottaway 
(2003) argues that Azerbaijan is a semiauthoritarianism of decay, meaning that it moves through 
a more institutionalized semiauthoritarianism (like Egypt‟s) toward a greater authoritarianism.18 
David Mastro and Kyle Christensen (2006) suggest that Azerbaijan cannot be classified as a full-
fledged democracy, and Azerbaijan‟s political system is still in the early stages of 
                                                 
13
 Dahl, Robert A. On Democracy. Found in: 
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Democracy/On_Democracy_Dahl.html 
14
 Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. University of 
Oklahoma Press, Norman. p. 15, 16, 35  
15
 Mastro, David. Christensen, Kyle. 2006. Power and Policy Making: The Case of Azerbaijan. Found in: 
http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2006/Mastro.pdf  p.4  
16
 Ibid.  
17
 Guliyev, Farid. 2005. Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Transition to Sultanistic Semi-Authoritarianism? An Attempt at 
Conceptualization. Demokratizatsiya 13(3): p. 397  
18
 Ibid. p.413  
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democratization with elements of both authoritarianism and democracy present.
19
 Farid Guliyev 
(2005) posits that post-Soviet Azerbaijan belongs to the semiauthoritarian type of political 
regime with strong sultanistic tendencies having two important peculiarities: dynasticism 
(institutionalized corruption and nepotism) and the dominance of informal politics (family, 
cronies, clans, ad patronage are more influential social constructions than formal legal 
institutions).
20
   
 
A number of scholars have attached a special importance to the role of history and culture in the 
development of democracy. For instance, according to Rein Muellerson, democracy, democratic 
institutions and values are more intimately related to and dependent on the history and culture of 
society than economic and financial institutions.
21
 Meanwhile, Azerbaijani academia makes 
more efforts in preserving inherent cultural norms in the wake of globalization. Academician 
Ramiz Mehdiyev argues: “How is the modernization of Azerbaijan to take place within the 
context of globalization and westernization? Can we reject westernization and become 
modernized while preserving our national “Me”? The answer is both simple and complicated. 
Indeed all countries of South-East Asia have gone through this historical path. Modernization 
concept of Japanese intellectuals was “Western technology and Japanese spirit.”22 Such 
arguments may derive from a nationalist position indicating post-modern/post-colonial approach 
to the authority of the West. However, it may also be argued that the level of Japanese 
technological development and industrial self-sufficiency is well beyond comparison with that of 
a country such as Azerbaijan. At the same time, one could argue that Japanese political relations, 
also to a great extent its human relations, conform to Western democratic principles. Maintaining 
Japanese customs and traditions, its “spirit”, has not conflicted with adopting democratic 
principles of governance by the Japanese authorities.  
 
Mehdiyev is a leading figure within the current government and his stance exemplifies the 
attitude of the older generation in terms of maintenance of Azeri traditions and national identity. 
It is often assumed by the conservative elements within the Azeri society that the development in 
Western technology can be acquired without adopting related features of Western culture that 
promoted this development, such as promotion of democratic institutions and merit-based 
recruitment and promotion into public office.   
 
Moreover, cultural historians, who work on complex and dynamic societies, have generally 
assumed that cultures are quite changeable, and even relatively “simple” societies are also found 
by anthropologists to be remarkably mutable.
23
 On the other hand, Ronald Inglehart underscores: 
“Cultural theory implies that a culture cannot be changed overnight. One may change the rulers 
and the laws, but to change basic aspects of the underlying culture generally takes many years.… 
Furthermore, when basic cultural change does occur, it will take place more rapidly among 
younger groups (where it does not need to overcome the resistance of inconsistent early learning) 
than among older ones, resulting in intergenerational differences.”24    
 
                                                 
19
 Mastro, David. Christensen, Kyle. 2006. Power and Policy Making: The Case of Azerbaijan. Found in: 
http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2006/Mastro.pdf   p.8 
20
 Guliyev, Farid. 2005. Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Transition to Sultanistic Semi-Authoritarianism? An Attempt at 
Conceptualization. Demokratizatsiya 13(3): p. 416, 423-24 
21
 Mullerson, Rein. Democracy: history not destiny. 2008. Found in: 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/idea/democratisation-history-policy-destiny   
22
 Mehdiyev, Ramiz. 2007. Globalization and National Values. Journal of Philosophy and Socio-political Studies, 3: 
p.73 (in Azeri, translation by this researcher)  
23
 Bonnell, Victoria E., Hunt, Lynn. Eds. 1999. Beyond the Cultural Turn. London. p.54 
24
 Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 
Societies. Princeton University Press. p.19 
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Today traditional-patriarchal Azeri society faces democratic and culturally alien Western ideas 
and values. Such a confrontation causes numerous challenges and reactions among the populace. 
According to Inglehart, a phenomenon called the authoritarian reflex has been observed in 
societies when rapid change leads to severe insecurity, giving rise to a powerful need for 
predictability in the form (1) fundamentalist or nativist reactions, and (2) adulation of strong 
secular leaders.
25
 It is also true for Azerbaijan though there can be overlapping legacies of the 
old systems both Azeri ethnic (rule of the khans, beys, etc.) and the Soviet authoritarian political 
system.  
 
The shift toward modernization is not a new phenomenon in Azerbaijan. The first wave of 
modernization was pushed by a great generation of Azeri enlighteners such as M. F. 
Akhundzade, H. Zerdabi, J. Mammadguluzade, N. Vezirli, M. A.  Sabir, U. Hajibeyli and 
flourished during the oil boom of Baku in the second half of the 19
th
 century and lasted till 
Soviet usurpation of the first secular government of Azerbaijan – Azerbaijan Democratic 
Republic in 1920. The second wave of Azeri modernization continued under the Soviet agenda 
and because of the Soviet propaganda it was presented as the very first wave. Farideh Heyat 
reveals the common fallacy, propagated by Soviet writers, that Azeri women (along with Muslim 
Central Asian women) were liberated from the veil for the first time by the Soviet government 
and given the opportunity of a modern education.
26
 The third wave of Azeri modernization has 
started since the 1991 independence. However, Mehdiyev considers that ideology of 
modernization started in 1993 and main task of its current third wave was to carry out 
technological changes, as well as ensure the preservation of originality of national culture, 
provide with reliable social protection and certainly ensure individual freedom, and thus combine 
economic efficiency with social justice.
27
 
 
According to Inglehart, modernization is, above all, a process that increases the economic and 
political capabilities of a society through industrialization and bureaucratization accordingly, and 
therefore the core process of modernization is industrialization; and the transition from 
preindustrial society to industrial society brings a shift from traditional, usually religious values, 
to rational-legal values in economic, political, and social life.
28
 Azerbaijan went through this 
kind of modernization under the Soviet system even though industrialization and the consequent 
urbanization were inadequate, and far short of what took place in the West.  
 
Furthermore, Inglehart argues: “While modernization was not necessarily linked with 
democratization, Postmodernization does seem to be inherently conducive to the emergence of 
democratic political institutions.”29 The author defines postmodernism as the rejection of 
modernity, the revalorization of tradition and the rise of new values and lifestyles, with greater 
tolerance for ethnic, cultural, and sexual diversity and individual choice concerning the kind of 
life one wants to lead. However, the revalorization of tradition is sharply selective; for example, 
the norm that “women‟s place is in the home” and the stern prohibition of extramarital sex is not 
among the aspects of premodern tradition.
30
  
 
                                                 
25
 Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 
Societies. Princeton University Press. p. 38 
26
 Heyat, Farideh. 2005. Azeri Women in Transition: Women in Soviet and Post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Baku, 
Chashioglu. 2
nd
 edition. p.76 
27
 Mehdiyev, Ramiz. 2007. Globalization and National Values. Journal of Philosophy and Socio-political Studies, 3: 
p.74 (in Azeri, translation by this researcher)  
28
 Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 
Societies. Princeton University Press. p.5   
29
 Ibid. p.14 
30
 Ibid. p.23, 25  
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Given the inadequate background of industrialization and urbanization in Azerbaijan, the revival 
and reinvention of Islam may hinder the process of democratization in the country. Muslim 
countries such as Iran and Egypt did also go through modernization, but the rise of Islam and the 
revival of its traditions such as re-veiling, did not necessarily lead to the consolidation of 
democracy.
31
  
 
 
2. Methodology  
 
Qualitative research methods such as participatory observation and in-depth interviews were 
employed in this research to collect data. First, relevant local and Western literature was studied 
and referred to, comparing relevant countries such as Tajikistan, Tatarstan (Russian Federation), 
Turkey, Iran and Arab countries. Definitions by Robert A. Dahl for democracy, Samuel P. 
Huntington for democratization, Ronald Inglehart for modernization and postmodernization are 
used in the study.  
 
Second, Baku and Lenkaran were selected as research sites: capital Baku as a relatively 
cosmopolitan city and the town of Lenkaran as a regional variety. Field work started with 
introduction and familiarization with the sites and took approximately half a month for each 
place. Then I participated in and observed respondents‟ social life in their domestic, public and 
work environments, and interviewed them for a month and a half.  
 
In each research site, field work proceeded with participatory observation – observing target 
groups and participating in their life activities as well as attending local meetings, social 
gatherings, such as public holidays; social visits, such as dinners, parties; attending work places, 
such as factories, shops, and visits to bazaars. This period also served to identify potential 
respondents and gain their confidence. Interviewing included fifteen structured questions, with 
follow up semi-structured and open-ended questions.  
 
A sample of target group was selected at each research site from among, first, university students 
including Baku State University, Economic University and Azerbaijan Technical University in 
Baku, and Lenkaran State University in Lenkaran; and, second, employed and unemployed 
young people. The youth age in this research ranged from 18 to 34. The main selection criterion 
was to identify relatively typical and atypical samples in order to cover the whole spectrum of 
the youth through local contacts and networks. Respondents were selected according to 
“snowball sampling strategy by identifying cases of interest from people who know what cases is 
information rich”.32 In each site ten (10) young males and ten (10) young females, overall forty 
(40) young people were interviewed. Selection categories included employment or professional 
and unemployment or nonprofessional; the first half of the male and female respondents in each 
site had complete higher education and the second half had either secondary school education or 
still were students at university.    
 
For Baku distinction can be made among native inhabitants (1 male and 2 females), the first 
generation (4 males and 4 females), second generation (1 male) and newcomers (4 males and 4 
females). For Lenkaran distinction can be made among native inhabitants (6 males and 8 
females) and newcomers (4 males and 2 females).    
 
                                                 
31
 The recent events surrounding the presidential elections in Iran is the latest example of the difficulty of 
establishing democracy in this country.  
32
 McDavid. 2005. Applying Qualitative Evaluation Methods. Found in: 
http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/6195_Chapter_5___McDavid_I_Proof_3.pdf  p.183 
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Official statistics does not provide with the exact number of the youth living with parental 
family, extended family and alone. Among my respondents in Baku twelve (12) out of twenty 
(20) lived with parents, three (3) with extended family, two (2) with own nuclear family, two (2) 
with siblings and one (1) alone. In Lenkaran, thirteen (13) out of twenty (20) respondents lived 
with parents, three (3) with own nuclear family, two (2) with extended family and two (2) with 
roommates.  
 
Table 01 at pages 34-35 provides with broader information on my interviewees‟ background. 
Throughout this research their real names are replaced with code names such as Ba-01 or Le-01 
for Baku and Lenkaran respondents, accordingly.    
 
Secondary data on youth migration, employment, education and related programs was obtained 
from the State Statistics Offices, youth movements, women‟s organizations and a number of 
relevant reports and websites. Moreover, one (1) elderly and three (3) young foreigners including 
three American females and one Canadian male living in the research sites for a considerable 
period of time were interviewed to find out and compare their observations and experiences.   
 
Finally, the research reflects my life observations and local knowledge as an insider. I was born 
in 1976 in Kabirli village of Beylagan in a Soviet-Muslim family.
33
 At the age of 17, I moved to 
Baku for study and employment reasons. Since graduating from university I have worked with a 
number of national and international organizations around the country, and extensively traveled 
and lived across Azerbaijan from Zagatala to Lenkaran, as well as abroad including Germany 
and Czech Republic.  
 
 
3. Early Socialization and Gender Norms   
 
Attitudes towards Females  
 
The gendered patterns of behavior and social attitudes that are dominant in the Azeri culture are 
promoted in early childhood and reinforced by toys, textbooks and school programs.
34
 According 
to the prevailing stereotypes, girls are supposed to be quiet, shy, docile and naïve; and boys – 
assertive, bold and aggressive. When the opposite of the expected features are observed in an 
individual, they face criticism and are discouraged by peers and the community. For instance, a 
quiet boy or an aggressive girl is disapproved of and mocked. Growing up in these conditions 
contributes to gender segregated plays, places of entertainment and association from the early 
childhood and further deepens in teenage and youth period. For example, Le-17, 27 year old 
female volunteer of a Women‟s Organization in Lenkaran town observes:   
 
“This opinion is formed in us from our childhood like: “Do not play with boys! Girls should not 
play with boys!”, even though as a child I do not comprehend what is bad with this. Only an idea 
is penetrated in my brain that it is bad to play with boys.” 
 
Strong distinction in gender values and expectations culminates in spoiling the boys (by not 
teaching them discipline, giving into their demands easily, etc.) and encourage meekness and 
obedience in the girls. “Since early childhood girls are taught that it is not a woman‟s job to deal 
with politics and make responsible decisions. Their major responsibilities include being a model 
                                                 
33
 Beylagan is a south-west region situated on the border with Iran, 265 km from Baku. 
34
 These have been discussed in the works of Western scholars (Heyat, 2006, 2005; Tohidi, 1998, 1996) studying 
women and gender in Azerbaijan. It is confirmed by my own observations, as an insider, and my life experience in 
the country.  
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wife, mother and housekeeper, and men (father/brother/husband) should solve all the remaining 
problems for them.”35 The consequent gender behavior of this kind of upbringing reinforces 
authoritarian system in a way that it produces authoritarian male and obedient female citizens 
that could be perfect for the totalitarian Soviet system or authoritarian Muslim societies. Scholars 
(Heyat, 2006; Harris, 2004) observe that this is subverted by the influence mothers have over 
their sons or sometimes older sisters over their brother. Besides, one can argue that males are 
also subject to the authority of elders in the authoritarian society. In this regard, within such 
societies males‟ subordination to authorities in public is compensated with exercising more 
power in the home, on the womenfolk and children.    
  
The existing features of Azeri femininity require “women‟s appropriate comportment in 
observing gender and generational deference (kişiyə və böyüyə hörmət), acting with modesty and 
shame (həyalı) and most of all observing namus (sexual honour)”.36 Since marriage and 
procreation in early years of married life are regarded as the greatest accomplishments for 
females, parents make efforts for their daughters to meet “requirements” of marriageability (such 
as being a domesticated and submissive girl, and getting married before the age of 25, not 
necessarily having higher education) rather than preparing them as a full-fledged citizen. In the 
country, average marriage age consists 23.5 for females and 28.1 for males.
37
 Expectations such 
as “a girl should be modest (look down)” (qız uşağı başıaşağı olar) or “a girl should not talk 
much” (qız uşağı çox danışmaz) discourage girls from active communication and hinder 
development of their ideas and ability to articulate.
 
These restrictions disempower girls and 
young females, and hinder their mobility and social development (acquiring social skills and 
access to education and vocational training). In this regard, 24 year old US citizen Julie, who has 
taught English at one of the Lenkarani town schools for 2 years, observes:    
 
 “It is very difficult, especially when girls want to go to America; they have to write an essay 
about themselves and they simply cannot be modest in this; the modesty will not pass, will not be 
chosen, the program do not want modest people; they want active people, who will easily fit in 
American culture. Boys do not have so much trouble because they do whatever they want; they 
have opinion, they have experiences but to work with girls on their essays is very, very difficult. 
Like when have you been a leader? They cannot think of a time when they are a leader. Why do 
you want to go to America? Like what would you like to learn? They always say they want to 
learn English whereas one boy wrote how he would go to an American jail and see how the 
criminal system works; another boy wanted to be a journalist and study how newspapers were 
prepared. But girls are very limited; they only talk about teaching because that is only kind of 
job.” 
 
In married life such a gender role ends up with passing of the control of female from her parents 
to her husband and the latter dominates in the wife‟s making life decisions from her social 
mobility to her appearance, to academic or employment issues, etc. “However, females 
themselves rarely protest against the stereotypes, which are considered to be “true” gender roles 
and have been instilled in them from childhood like “women should deal with household and 
bring up children”, “final decision is made by the husband in the family”, “woman is not 
incomplete only if there is a man next to her”, “man is always stronger than woman and he is 
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more adapted to life, especially to social life”. Therefore, even today, when the situation is being 
changed, the husband uses autocracy”.38  
 
In an effort to meet requirements of the expected Azeri femininity, the females give up their 
academic and work plans, and adjust themselves to the restrictions put by their elders and 
menfolk. For example, at the beginning of 2008, gender ratio of candidate of science students 
(aspirantura) in philology were 60.9% females and 39.1% males; for the same period, gender 
ratio of students enrolled for doctorate (doktorantura) in the same field were 36.4% females and 
63.6% males.
39
 Here is an example of how women may lose the sight of their ambitions for 
gaining higher education and career development in order to fit into a domestic role that is 
acceptable for them. 31 year old Le-03 works a psychology teacher at one of Lenkarani town 
schools and remembers how her dream of becoming a PhD student vanished:  
 
“I had a dream of earning PhD by the age of 26. I calculated that if I finished my bachelor and 
master in 1999 and 2001 accordingly, I would complete PhD at age 26 or 27. But then I got 
married and lost my eagerness.”  
 
Furthermore, there is a clear distinction between female and male jobs in Azerbaijan due to the 
gender stereotypes. Teacher is one of the widespread female jobs, which does not “harm” 
female‟s reputation. For the beginning of 2007/2008 academic years, women mostly gave 
preference to the specialities related to humanities and social sciences, education and natural 
sciences, health as well as culture and art specialties.
40
  
 
Generally, uneducated urban and provincial females demonstrate similar degree of obedience to 
menfolk, whereas educated provincial females exercise more power in their gender relations. Ba-
14, female, 25, was born and lives in the center of Baku; she works as a ticket seller at one of the 
theaters. When I asked her about this interview, she said she would let me know after getting her 
husband‟s permission, as she put it, the head of the family, and agreed to interview her only in 
their home. When I asked her opinion about the referendum (March 18, 2009) she replied:  
 
“I do not want to think anything. It is not my business. Let my husband answer this question.” 
 
On the contrary, Le-03‟s broader knowledge provides her with the leverage for manipulation of 
the situation in her favor, and she relates this to one‟s worldview:  
 
“I do not ask my husband like „shall I go somewhere or shall I do this?‟ I do not put this question, 
nor ask permission. I behave as if it is an accepted variant like I am invited to a certain place and I 
will attend, and here is my notice.” 
 
One can notice that unmarried females have to make more efforts to conform to the expected 
features of Azeri femininity. As marriage continues, females gain more flexibility, while the 
unmarried ones are more protected by family and lack space in the society. This contributes to 
restricting unmarried females‟ chances of social mobility, be it travel within Azerbaijan or 
abroad, or attending social events. It can be one of reasons why the percentage of never married 
female migrants is considerably less than that of married ones and males: in 2007, distribution of 
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migrants (departures) by marital status consisted 35.5% females and 64.5% males among never 
married, and 57.4% females and 42.2% males among married people.
41
  
 
Here is an apt example of young single female lacking freedom of social mobility. 20 year old 
Le-06 works as a primary school teacher and lives with her parents and brother in Lenkaran 
town. As a number of my female respondents alluded, she normally asks permission from her 
mother when she goes out:  
 
“There are places where I know if I insist mum will allow going; however there are places I even 
do not need to ask and tire myself. For example, last year there was a seminar at the Women‟s 
Organization in Lenkaran. Other two seminars were planned to hold in Sheki and Baku. The 
organizers selected those who were active in the seminar to join the next events. I was among the 
four selected. I simply did not tell at home. The responsible person kept calling for 3 days and 
told whether he should talk to my mum. I knew that whether he talked or not mother would not 
allow anyway. When I was in the 11
th
 form there was an exam for one year study in the US. In 
order to prevent me from applying, mum hid my birth card. She had done it so diligently that we 
could hardly find it later to get my identification card issued. ”  
 
The roles of mother and wife as “the custodians of custom and tradition, adət və ənənə” are 
highly respected and they enjoy considerable power in the society than unmarried or single 
females.
42
 For example, Leyla, female, 27, from Lenkaran town lives and works with an 
international organization based in Baku; her mother is the head of the Women‟s Organization in 
Lenkaran. Leyla notices how her mother‟s status of being a married woman has empowered the 
latter:  
 
“Here in Lenkaran many women are able to join events organized in the Women‟s Organization. 
It is because its chairperson is my mum (Natavan). Everyone knows who she is. For example, 
they know she has normal family, children and husband. One of mum‟s assistants says “My 
husband‟s character is very strict, but he allows me to work here since Mrs. Natavan is the 
chairwoman”. Recently another woman launched a woman center in the town but it did not work, 
because she was a kind of alverçi (dealer).” 
 
Heyat endorses this as one of the paradoxes of the Soviet gender ideology. “…Neither would 
many foreign visitors gain a clue to the influence and agency of women as wives and mothers, 
leading to a sense of empowerment. It was clear to me that women‟s primary involvement with 
the home and the education of the children in addition to being breadwinners, equal in the eyes 
of the law, greatly enhanced their authority over their menfolk and especially the sons, whom 
they could control and call to account.”43 
  
Meanwhile, recent studies (Heyat, 2008; Gureyeva, 2003) show that in the past few years young 
Azeri females have empowered themselves through re-veling. This is no return to old traditions 
of veiling, but voluntarily adopting a form of dress that signals respectability through an image 
of modesty and chastity.
44
 However, one can observe that the image of alternative modern 
femininity is diminishing in Baku and regions since the government encourages secularisation 
(recent closing of some mosques in Baku), and tendency for Western style casual dress is 
growing among young Azeri females in the wake of the proliferation of Western clothing shops 
such as Mango, Mexx, United Colors of Benetton in Baku.  
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According to the accounts of my respondents, the contemporary young Azeri females are 
captured in the situation, where they have to either conform to the gender expectations of the 
society whether this coincide with their individual preferences or not, or prove enough wisdom 
to manipulate the situation in their favor. Gender inequality instilled in them from early 
childhood often discourages them to take full responsibility for their life decisions and act as an 
independent member in the society. Consequently, females face various 
discriminations/obstacles (e.g. lack of social mobility, ageism) to develop individual autonomy, 
though these are not always realized, but internalized by them.  
 
A sense of social responsibility is not cultivated in Azeri females, since their primary 
responsibility is supposed to be the care of family and the home, and first of all bearers of 
namus, which as discussed earlier entails numerous restrictions on female‟s individual freedom. 
“A culture may assign disparate weights to the value of male and female life, as in much of the 
Muslim world. In such cultures, democracy is far less likely to take root”.45 For example; the 
number of females drops out at schools and universities (growing number of early marriages is 
the main reason for dropouts);
46
 they enjoy little freedoms of mobility and association; they have 
less access to entertainment and relaxation, which directly contributes to spiritual relief and 
refreshes one‟s mind and body; their involvement is reduced in social events and public life 
(given that they cannot attend social events without accompaniment of their menfolk or elders, 
and evening curfew is a must); they become unaware of their social rights and ignorant of their 
responsibilities; their modest upbringing and given opportunities prevent them from taking 
initiative, joining active decision making and taking accountable measures; they are rare in 
higher positions. Nayereh Tohidi writes that many factors, including the strain of the “double 
burden” (meaning female‟s official employment and housework in the home), gender role 
socialization and lower self-esteem, lack of experience, traditional gender stereotypes and sexist 
discrimination in society at large, and finally the state‟s policy have all contributed to the small 
numbers of women in public office and low levels of women‟s participation in politics.47   
 
Specifically, three of the fundamental democratic rights: freedom of expression, freedom of 
association and equal participation (Dahl, 1998) are violated throughout life of the majority of 
Azeri females at an individual level, and this retards democracy in a larger extent in the society. 
It is a catch-22 situation: in general, it is assumed that female accomplishment is the 
responsibility of males; at the same time, the society expects the female to be involved in a 
productive life and bear social responsibility.      
 
 
Azeri Masculinity  
 
The concept of masculinity in the Azeri culture incorporates Turkic-Muslim and Soviet features 
and puts enormous emphasis on the notion of qeyrət (male honour or manliness). Qeyrət is 
associated with defending one‟s women and the homeland (vətən).48 Because Azeri women play 
the roles of “the ultimate symbol and signifier of the nation” as in the culturally similar 
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Tatarstan, Azeri men are obliged to “protect” females of their nation, whereas sexual purity or 
chastity of females is subject to this kind of protection.
49
  
 
However, in practice it is often narrowed to the protection of own womenfolk or at most 
community females while violating chastity of other females. Harris mentions the same basic 
approach both in the Arab countries and Tajikistan, “where men aim to have (sexual) contact 
with as many women as they can, while simultaneously endeavoring to keep their own women 
pure”.50 Such an approach prohibits the male and female from interacting as two individuals and 
not just members of opposite sex. For example, when I asked if Le-18 kept contact with females 
at work, he seemed to interpret this as intimate contact and rejected it at first. He is a 30 year old 
unemployed male, born in Lenkaran, who previously worked as a security administrator at a 
transportation agency in Baku: 
  
“There is no such thing and I have not interest either. Sometimes, it happens but there are special 
places for that. I contacted the girls at my work place sincerely; I am sincere and hope that was 
also accepted sincerely. I did not have any bad intention to them either. However, it happens, we 
are young (cavanıq).51 Someone calls and so on. Personally I came back to Lenkaran 4 months 
ago and I have nothing to do here. I usually do nothing at the place, where I work and live. 
Outside, many things happen; often in Baku, there are special places for that.”     
 
Judith Butler (1999) suggests that the development of agency is intimately linked to the 
development of sexual desire.
52
 However, the development of sexuality of both Azeri females 
and males in general is under question given traditional Muslim restrictions on gender relations 
further complicated with Soviet legacy of taboos on open discussion of sex. The situation is 
aggravated with the fact that sex education is practically non-existent in the schools.
53
 “There are 
no sex education programs. The school curriculum includes two-hour lectures during biology 
classes that depict male and female genitalia and the process of conception. This lecture… does 
not incorporate issues of gender equality and mutual respect. Traditional stereotypes that prevail 
in society prevent open discussion about sex in school auditoriums”.54 These factors stay at the 
root of the Azeri youth gender relations, and reinforce the lack of communication, friendship and 
interpersonal trust between sexes, and contribute to the prevalence of arranged marriages and 
divorces.  
 
With regard to the Azeri youth gender relations, an Azeri proverb reads: “One cannot place fire 
and gun powder together”, or “one cannot place fire and cotton together”. Here “fire” symbolizes 
male and “gun powder” or “cotton” – female. Both my male and female respondents recalled this 
to validate the existing situation. For example, Le-15, a 27 year old adult education teacher from 
Lenkaran town justifies his lack of female friends with this belief:  
 
“During the university years I had more female friends but now only males. They say fire and gun 
powder cannot be together. It is not my opinion. Simply, the majority favors this.” 
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Ironically, traditional approach to the youth gender relations refrains the youth from close 
contact with the opposite sex between the average marriage age – 23 and 28, which can be 
considered a crucial period for career development. It also contributes to the lack of neutral 
relations and friendship between young males and females. Some of my male and female 
respondents were aware of this, but did not know how to change the situation. For instance, Le-
14, 20, was born and lives in Lenkaran town together with his parents, grandparents and sister. 
He is a student and one of the responsible members of Lenkaran branch of a European youth 
organization. He observes like many of the respondents:  
 
“The existing relations put some restrictions on girls so that they cannot create normal relations 
with boys as human beings. If you say “I am friend with a girl”, the elders say “how a boy‟s 
friendship can be with a girl?” Some girls do not accept this either. Even if you accept her as a 
friend and approach her she interprets it otherwise. I would like to change this, because one gets 
bored of monotony. How much you can talk/chat with boys? It is also necessary to find out girl‟s 
opinion. Maybe this will change my attitude to her completely.”  
 
Le-13, female, 21, is Lenkarani Russian. She compares the situation to that of Russia:  
 
“Here girls and boys are not friends. If a boy approaches you in Lenkaran, there is an intention 
behind it. He does not approach to make friendship with you, but either “wants” you (istəmək, 
here meaning to love) or “wants to go out with you” (gəzmək, here meaning to go out). Friendship 
is totally a different thing, when you can sit and talk with your male friend. In Russia, I have seen, 
male says to female directly: “I approach you for this and that”. But here they do it by deceiving. 
I want this freedom. There is no reason to deceive each other.”  
 
Considering the degree of higher anonymity and availability of broader possibilities in Baku 
youth gender relations are relatively more free and developed than in Lenkaran. Still one‟s 
perspective relies on the combination of factors such as degree of exposure to Western culture, 
level of education, awareness of one‟s rights and responsibilities, and family background. For 
example, Ba-06, male, 25, was born and lives in Yasamal district of Baku with his mother and 
sister. He is an uneducated and self-employed construction master with low income. He has 
never been to any of the theatres/cinemas, nor has he joined any events held by various youth 
organizations in the city. He adheres to strict gender relations, for instance, wants womenfolk to 
agree their actions with him as the head of the family and disapproves of young females laughing 
in public places; despite his low income he would feel ashamed if his mother and sister worked 
and brought money home.  
 
On the other hand, Ba-09, male, 27, born in Jabrail and lives in Baku. His father and grandfather 
had a great pressure on his choice of career and course of study. He continued his study in 
Berlin, Germany for 8 years and now teaches at Baku State University. He admits that his typical 
Azeri male attitudes towards Azeri females underwent changes after 5 years living abroad, and 
dreams of liberal youth gender relations in Azerbaijan:  
 
“When I was abroad for the first time I had a feeling that if the Azeri girls studying abroad were 
my sisters; I did not see them as a sexual object. If they went out with some guys, I used to 
disapprove of this, and even once I had conflict with one of the girls in this regard. However, I 
started changing my attitude gradually. I wish young Azeris from opposite sexes could live 
together and parents could accept their cohabitation; I wish they had child out of marriage; What 
if a woman wants to kiss her man in public – let it be. When I talk about feminism, I want to talk 
about sex with my students, majority of whom are females; at least once I have to use or write 
this word; but I have to refrain from doing so because the female students would feel bad, or they 
would think something else, or boys would ridicule me (ələ salmaq). I wish I could talk with my 
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parents about this without any problem. Sometimes, their argument is namely about sexual issue 
and I would like to use the same arguments and answer them. However, I cannot do this; if I 
express my opinion openly it would be understood as a swear-word (söyüş).”   
  
One of the expected features of Azeri masculinity is deference to ağsaqqal (literally “the white 
beards” – elderly men) and ağbirçək (“the white fringes/hairs” – elderly women), which are 
among “fundamental institutions of the ethnic Azeri culture”.55 It can be shown in the forms of 
etiquettes such as making way for the elders and not smoking in their presence, or listening to 
their advice (öyüd-nəsihət) in all aspects of one‟s life, not talking back (söz qaytarmamaq) and 
especially, not conversing like peers (tay-tuş kimi danışmamaq), but by preserving a certain 
distance, etc. An Azeri proverb states that you better sit at a place without God, but not without 
the elder (Allahsız yerdə otur, böyüksüz yerdə oturma). However, a closer examination of the 
intergenerational relations can reveal that youth employment in the professions and economic 
empowerment have relatively decreased the deference to the elders to the level of a mere 
symbolism. Among some of my male respondents such as professional and self-employed youth 
with independent means of income I observed criticism and rejection of different aspects of the 
rule of the elders. At the same time, the youth who were economically dependent on their elders 
and shared housing with them, they displayed more obedience towards their elders.   
 
Moreover, there exist male stereotypes such as having authority over wife/daughter/sisters that 
reinforce male supremacy and authoritarianism in the society. Elements of this culture are 
embedded in children from early childhood, for instance, through labor division among siblings. 
Sons are not asked for help in doing domestic work by their mother and even to help themselves, 
whereas daughters are prepared to do housework accurately (clean, wash, cook, etc.) and serve 
their brothers and father (iron their dress, serve tea and food, etc.). Female obedience to male 
authority in the parental home is replicated to the wife‟s subordination to her husband and his 
elders in married life, and female workers subordination to male boss and elderly employees at 
work, and female citizens‟ submissiveness to authorities in public. Conformity to these gender 
norms associated with maintaining tradition, and the identity politics in the country. It is 
controlled and reinforced by the elders through psychological pressure tools such as reproach 
and mockery. For instance, 31 year old Ba-20 lives in his father‟s house in Yasamal; he is a 
shoemaker, married and has a daughter; his 26 year old wife reminds:  
 
“My husband‟s parents exert influence over him. Once, two years ago, he helped me with 
housework; we cleaned the bedroom together, took out heavy blankets and mattresses, etc. In that 
evening he said in presence of his father: “I am tired”; father mocked: “You have done female 
job, that‟s why you are tired (arvad işi görmüsən, ona görə yorulmusan).” I mean he just helped 
me take heavy things out. After that, my husband said: “No, I will not do it again.”  
 
Females do all the domestic chores and males should avoid it. Mothers under the “double 
burden” (Tohidi, 1998) prefer accomplishing all housework alone rather than dividing related 
responsibilities among her husband and sons. Feminist Azeri scholar Alov Eyvazova gave an 
example of this
56
:  
 
“I had neighbors with three adult sons in Baku. The wife used to work 8 hours outside like her 
husband. After work she continued doing housework, while her husband was stretching himself in 
front of TV and the sons shouting like “mum, have not you ironed my shirt yet?” or “mum, isn‟t 
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food ready yet?” One day I asked her: “Why don‟t you instruct your sons to help you?” She 
protested: “Oh, no! I do not want them to grow up like arvadağız”.   
 
Arvadağız or ağabacı are the characteristics of males who are considered to be effeminate and 
are condemned by “true Azeri masculinity”. In this regard, an Azeri proverb reads: “Keep away 
from an effeminate man and from a masculine woman” (Arvad üzlü kişidən, kişi üzlü arvaddan 
əlhəzər). The following section examines how the existing family relations contribute to the 
perpetuation of the traditional Azeri femininity and masculinity.    
 
 
4. Family Relations  
 
Parents and children   
 
The current generation of parents of the Azeri youth grew up under the Soviet system. Family 
relations are often patriarchal and hierarchal which can be observed in the type of upbringing of 
children. Obedience to elders by children are expected and taken for granted. Parents and 
children are not friends and open with each other. However, children are more relaxed with their 
mothers. Children, especially girls are expected to contact their father through the mediation of 
mothers in order to maintain distance from the father and thus preserve his authority as the head 
of the family who plays the role of arbiter in the family. Daughters cannot communicate with 
fathers directly, though there are exceptions among intelligentsia and elites. It is a situation that 
prepares them for segregated gender roles. For instance, Ba-18, female, 23, born and lives in 
Baku, she has master degree in physics and works as a laboratory assistant at a steel factory. Her 
parents are from Shemkir region and she is raised traditionally. She is obedient and her views are 
conservative. 
 
“Once with group mates we returned very late from Guba.57 First, father did not tell anything to 
me directly, but from his behavior I understood that he did not approve that our teachers did not 
go with us. Father told: “Why you go alone to such a place? You do not know those people 
(group mates) and you do not know the roads.” Usually father says to mum and she extends to me 
like “father does not want to see this and that from you”. Sometimes mother gets angry with 
father like “if you want to tell anything, tell her directly; like this you make me bad in her eyes”. 
But I think it has to be like this. There must be a “curtain” (pərdə) between father and daughter. 
Father can tell anything to son but if he tells the daughter “why you come home at this time?” and 
I argue with him on this, it would “remove the curtain”. If father told me every small detail then 
respect would be lost between us.” 
  
Maintaining distance is an element of enforcing male authority and supremacy. Parents are more 
concerned about their daughter‟s conformity with cultural gender norms, given that they are 
carriers of namus and it ends up with preventing them from achieving their goals, withdrawing 
them from schools, discouraging them from study and active citizenry whereas sons are treated 
more with laissez-a-faire attitude and enjoy greater freedom. Fulfillment of parents‟ and in large 
the community‟s expectations hinder youth from developing an individual agenda and fulfilling 
personal goals.   
 
Azeri parents are very protective of their children and the psychological “umbilical chord” is not 
cut till adult ages. Eyvazova considers that because the rule of law is weak in the country, 
Azerbaijanis are more reliant on familial network.
58
 “The strength of the matrilineal bond among 
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Azeris (despite an overarching patriarchal system of gender and family relations) is still evident 
today in the emphasis given to relations with the khala (mother‟s sister) and dai (mother‟s 
brother)”.59 Probably therefore another informal Azeri expression for having a good contact is 
“to have uncle” (dayısı olmaq). It is considered parents‟ duty to make decisions on behalf of their 
children from education to marriage to travel to selection of friends and so on. Parental web of 
love and support traps and disempowers young people. For example, Ba-15, female, 29, born and 
lives in Baku with her parents, has a master degree in Math and works for the Ministry of 
Communication and Technology. She represents a typical educated young Azeri female who 
lacks freedom despite of a reasonable income. Like many of my female respondents Ba-15 says:  
 
“I would live alone if I had opportunity; I would like to live alone. But within Azerbaijan I cannot 
go and live separate from my parents. I know this very well, because the society will not accept it 
well. But I would like to go away to any foreign country, at least for living alone. And lately I 
have been preoccupied with shopping. Indeed I do not need to buy anything new, but it is just to 
bring a change to my life, since I have nothing to do except from going to work and coming back 
home. I cannot join any events after work, because it is considered to be late and my mum cannot 
accompany me because of her illness.” 
 
Respect for elders and traditional-cultural norms further disempower youth. The notion of 
respect turns into a mechanism of control and suppression. It translates into emotional distance 
(ciddi olmaq – being serious /formal) and leads to a lack of communication between older and 
younger generations. Respect is a multi-faceted word used in social relations in Azeri culture. 
Hörmət meaning respect in Azeri Turkish is also a word borrowed from Arabic probably in the 
early Middle Ages as the abovementioned namus, qeyrət and ayıb. This factor, namely semantics 
of these words governing the present traditional-cultural Azeri norms demonstrates the strong 
Muslim influence on Azeri culture. To pay respect (hörmət etmək) relates to corruption and 
means giving presents or offering favours.
60
 It is essential when interacting with one‟s elders, the 
ağsaqqal or ağbirçək; in the case of those in authority, this includes offering presents, paying 
one‟s due.61  
 
Nevertheless, it is also a hard situation for parents. They have to produce a legacy of good name 
for their children‟s future. Parents‟ clean name is important for children, especially mother‟s 
name for daughters. In this regard, an Azeri proverb says: First look at the mother, then marry 
the daughter (anasına bax, qızını al). However, elder‟s advice is accepted by youth selectively 
not absolutely. A distinction can be made between the Azeri youth who studied or traveled 
abroad and those who never enjoyed this opportunity. The part of Azeri youth that have not 
studied or traveled abroad, remain more attached to the existing traditions, show a great deal of 
conformity, though they are not always happy with them; besides, they are  aware the changing 
attitudes, but do not and/or cannot accept them personally. Younger generation opened up to 
Europe has started to show disobedience. For example, Ba-09 has a German girlfriend, who is 
not accepted by his parents since the whole idea of being boy/girl friend is not socially approved. 
Ba-09 reminds:   
 
“My father often says “How it happens that you make decision by yourself? You are a member of 
this family!” I answer that I am independent and want to decide by myself. Father says “How it 
can be? We brought you up!” I mean I have a feeling that my parents see me as a property. 
Though I am adult now, they treat me as a child. When I go somewhere I do not want to tell them 
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because I know that there will be a conflict, and then they find out and ask like why you did not 
tell us, you have to tell us!” 
 
Ba-09 lives with his parents as with most other Azeri youth. Living with parents till the age of 
marriage even afterwards is common in Azerbaijan. Collectivism versus individualism prevents 
youth from being independent and making free decisions. Living with parents and siblings make 
it difficult to separate oneself from the rest of the family and youth lack privacy. Following his 
study abroad the respondent has changed his perceptions. He is discontent with the elders‟ 
domination and does not want to be treated as a child by his parents who try to impose control 
and discipline. The parents do not want to accept these changes observed in their son either. This 
signals an intergenerational conflict in the family and a crisis of familial authority with further 
implications in the society. The tradition of respect for elders reinforces the elders‟ position at 
work and thus diminishes youth competitiveness. Ba-09 remarks:  
 
“Elderliness in many cases functions as a social status. At the academic level, being an elder is 
associated with a certain position; for example, at university usually majority of elder teachers are 
professors, scholars or teachers. Elderliness means experience and this experience itself gives a 
status according to which they feel themselves superior.”   
 
The social/intergenerational change happens slowly among educated and professional younger 
generation, when they are aware of the difference between the old and new systems and want to 
keep up with the time. Furthermore, the fact of being abroad alone cannot guarantee for the 
change in young people‟s views and attitudes. The number of Azeri work emigrants in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) obviously exceeds that of studying in western 
countries. In struggle for survival the former tends to maintain their cultural norms, while the 
latter develops alternative approach in an academic environment conducive to critical thinking.  
 
Nowadays, the presence of international community in the country, such as international NGOs 
offers alternative cultural patterns to the youth. For instance, Le-12, male, 27, born in a village of 
Astara (adjacent region to Lenkaran), now lives and works in Lenkaran town. He has worked in 
public sector since 2005, collaborated with branches of various international NGOs and now 
heads a local NGO on tourism. He says:  
 
“Frankly, before entering the university and working with the public sector for 2 years I had very 
little experience in this field. At that time I really thought woman had to be closed, because I kept 
my sister like that. But now I regret very much. I hate myself. Really! I did not grant freedom to 
my sister. But no, this should not be like this. For example, today I keep my life partner (həyat 
yoldaşı, a synonym of wife) completely independent; I agree with whatever she wants: let it be 
either visiting her mother‟s house or going out. However, I would consider negatively if she went 
out alone, without asking my permission. Let her inform me and go together with me, again 
according to her wish. I do not protest against her clothes either, though she does not wear 
openly. Here they regard the females wearing trousers negatively and some females are not 
allowed to wear trousers at all, but my wife wears it. Trousers are really a very civil dress. It is 
more practical and decent.” 
 
Le-12 exemplifies the youth accepting liberal and rational attitudes though very slowly. In an 
indirect contact with Western culture, he has discovered new features in himself, opened up and 
become more pragmatic in his gender views as well as relations with the elders.  
 
“After entering the university and NGO sector I did not agree with my father absolutely. When I 
started working with NGO in 2003 my father‟s attitude was very positive, but later when I started 
heading the NGO my father started distracting me from this by all means. He did not want to see 
me as his son any more. I lived in Lenkaran for 2 years without any support by parents. He even 
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organized a job for me at the technical school in Astara when I was in the 2
nd
 year of my part-time 
study at the university. I even went there and worked for a while but I did not like it. I realized the 
difference between two jobs. In NGO sector I was boss, I could gain more reputation but at the 
technical school any teacher would bring a list to me to type. I also observed that if I finished my 
job in time I had to idle there before any other teacher would bring something to type. It was just 
waste of time. I thought by myself with such work I would never hold a place in the society. But 
in order to return to Lenkaran I used an excuse for my father that I had to go back to the 
university (in Lenkaran) for winter sessions. He agreed. I left and never turned back.”  
 
The respondent has rejected father‟s type of approach and is an independent self-made man. In 
this regard, NGOs play the role of agents of social change and permeate Western attitudes. They 
place alternative management patterns at the disposal of the youth who are more eager to acquire 
them given their access to computer technology, internet and language skills. Furthermore, the 
presence of influential international organizations helps the youth have more confidence in their 
power than their elders in relationship with authorities.  
 
Le-12 emphasizes: “I myself would never dare to act independently. It is good that we have 
foreign organizations here! For example, when I had to be restored to the university they said it 
would be impossible without bribe, but I was restored without any bribe. Nobody could believe. 
Because they (local authorities) know me and they know that I have contacts.” 
 
Le-12 is an apt example of social change from authoritarian-patriarchal to more democratic 
norms in the provincial places. He is partly free from his father‟s generation of Soviet legacies 
such as conformity, obedience to and the strong fear of authority. This change is very marginal 
and fragile, and heavily dependent on the existence of foreign actors. In addition, the existing 
gender norms and intergenerational relations are maintained through hierarchal power relations 
between siblings.  
 
 
Siblings 
 
In Azeri families fathers pass authority of control of womenfolk to sons in the hierarchy. The 
older fathers get and the more adult sons become the more power the latter will gather to 
command over their sisters. Parents prepare siblings for segregated gender roles from their 
childhood. Some of the mainly encouraged features in girls, which will form their understanding 
of femininity later, are shyness, quietness and non-communication with boys; in boys they are on 
the contrary boldness, aggressiveness and communicability. For instance, Julie reminds:  
 
“We used to play at the schoolyard so that students could watch. It is a kind of football, the ball is 
lighter and it is easier to play than baseball. Sometimes you also saw girls watching. I tried to get 
girls to play. One of the girls who actually came out to the field was the sister of one of the boys 
who was playing and she would bring her friend. The brother and sister were in the 8
th
 and 6
th
 
forms accordingly. I tried to get her to play and he did not like the idea. I kept saying like she 
should come. Finally, one day she agreed to come. When she came out he called his mum and 
told her that her sister was trying to play and that she should not play, only boys were playing. So, 
the mother told the sister not to play.” 
 
In the provinces gender roles and relations continue to remain more traditional, puritanical and 
stricter. Under peer and elder‟s pressure, young males are obsessed with protecting their sisters 
which ends up with restricting them from a broad range of activities. Peer pressure especially 
reinforces and perpetuates gender attitudes and patterns of behavior. In this regard, Ba-09 
remarks:  
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“Such a tradition is transferred (from the older to the younger generations) like “you have to 
protect your mother and sister” and this gives the boy a justification (to act) that does not come 
from his nature (per se), but from the society. At school years, there were boys who were ready to 
stab anyone who swore a bad language against their sister. And it was not only accepted 
positively but that young boy was expected to behave like this! The point is that he is made to act 
like this; he has to!” 
 
Furthermore, younger females also expect such a protection and interference in their personal 
business from their brothers as a sign of their interest and brotherly care. It is to show the others, 
mainly community members and especially males that they have elders or “owners” to take care 
of them. This is to discourage strange males to seek unauthorized communication with females 
which is highly disgraceful given puritanical character of gender relations. Hence, even not 
brothers‟ age but their name/existence is often more important for sisters. For instance, Ba-01, 
female, 31, was born in Gazakh, lives in Baku and teaches at the University of Foreign 
Languages; her parents live in the region and she stays at her only youngest brother who is 
uneducated and works in one of the Baku bazaars. She says:  
 
“When I look at our society I feel envy those girls who say like “my father does not allow me to 
go this and that places” or “I have older brother than me and he does not allow me this and that”. 
I observe how people around listen carefully to those girls when they talk like this and afterwards, 
their respect for those girls increases threefold. At that moment, I think to myself: “Oh, I am so 
without control” (necə də başlı-başınayam) and then “why my father has given so much 
willpower to me?!” or “probably if my brother were elder than me it would be the same with me” 
or “if my brother were elder than me and acted like this then we would argue all day”.  
 
Ba-01 represents a conflicting type of young Azeri females who have gained relatively more 
power than their fathers and brothers thanks to their education and successful career in the city 
but are eager to show obedience to menfolk and thus conformity to the existing traditions. 
Females living without male authority (father/older brother/husband), who happen to be mainly 
unmarried, divorced and widow persons, lack respect in the community since they lack the 
authority to claim respect themselves. While Ba-01 struggles between her partly emancipated 
identity and “true Azeri femininity”, 20 year old Le-02 sincerely believes that her brothers are 
right in making decisions on her behalf. She lives in Lenkaran town and works as an assistant in 
a photo shop. When I asked her opinion about the referendum (March 18, 2009), she said she did 
not have so much information about it and if she had information she would think of it. Le-02‟s 
elder brothers (22 and 24 year old, uneducated), as in the cases of some of my urban and 
provincial respondents, did not find it necessary for her to have tertiary education:  
 
“My brothers considered it badly to study in Baku or in any other region. I think this is normal. 
Let them put restrictions because they know something and do so for the sake of my future. They 
are my brothers and would not wish anything bad to me.” 
 
This is a typical/classic Azeri sibling relation where we observe delegation of power from sister 
to brother. Young females like Le-02 and males like her brothers without higher education 
compose of the majority among the Azeri youth. For the beginning of 2006/2007 academic year, 
129.000 or 5.1% young people aged 18-34 years got tertiary education, out of the current Azeri 
youth, who is estimated to be 2.525.000 or 29.6% of the population on January 1, 2007 
(1.257.000 of them were males and 1.268.000 females accordingly).
62
 Besides, the education 
system is of low efficiency, though official literacy rate is very high (99.5% in 2007) in the 
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country.
63
 Corruption, the ineffectiveness of existing methods of managing and administering the 
educational system, the low quality of text books, the low salaries paid to teachers and the lack 
of fund for the training and re-training of teachers are among the main factors generating low 
efficiency of the education system.
64
  
The undemocratic nature of the existing sibling relations bring about the lack of civic activism 
among the broader layer of the youth. They are neither socially active, nor able to contribute to 
the building of civil society since they are unaware of ongoing socio-public events or when there 
is awareness they display ignorance deriving from unquestioning submissiveness to menfolk and 
elders.  
  
 
5. Compatibility of Azeri Cultural Norms with Civic-democratic Norms  
 
Mentalitet 
 
The establishment of open and democratic society is the development priority of Azerbaijani 
Government.
65
 According to Dahl, democracy produces desirable consequences including 
essential rights, general freedom, moral autonomy, human development, protecting essential 
personal interests, etc.
66
 Furthermore, according to Huntington, democratization stems from a 
number of independent variables such as the absence of feudalism in the society; social 
pluralism and strong intermediate groups; low levels of civil violence; traditions of tolerance 
and compromise; traditions of respect for law and individual rights that contribute to democracy 
and democratization.
67
 As examined in the other sections of this research paper, some features 
of Azeri youth gender norms and intergenerational relations contradict civic-democratic norms. 
The youth do not enjoy personal freedom and moral autonomy to exercise their rights, which are 
often even not realized and wanted as in the case of young females. Instead, they are trapped in 
the traditional/cultural systems of respect for elders, and obedience to strict gender norms, 
though “a democratic culture is almost certain to emphasize the value of personal freedom and thus 
to provide support for additional rights and liberties.”68   
 
A common discourse concerning tradition and identity among Azeris is the question of “our 
mentalitet”. This has become popularized among the elders and youth. On the one hand, it is 
referred to as the source of national pride; on the other hand, it is blamed as the source of 
backwardness and ignorance in the society. Mentality means “the particular attitude or way of 
thinking of a person or group”.69 Losing its original meaning, it has become an expression to 
define Azeri identity and morality, and measure any Azeri‟s conformity with a set of 
conventional rules regulating social relations including gender and intergenerational. For 
example, Le-18 (male, 30, Lenkaran town) rejects the idea of cohabitation (living together before 
marriage) and states:  
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“Their (Europeans) and our mentalitets are totally different. We have history of so many 
thousand years and our mentalitet has not changed. As far as I know, it is passed by heredity.” 
 
Similarly, Le-16, a 25 year old salesman in a small shoe shop, was born and lives in Lenkaran 
town. In the past he also lived and worked in Moscow and Baku for a few years. He tells about 
his attitude of the girls who go to bars:  
 
“Very bad. I have seen it on TV; there are bars where girls sit and drink, and things like this. I 
disapprove of it; it is not compatible with our mentalitet. I would not become a friend with those 
kinds of girls. As to the boys going to bar, if you look at them, they are human beings, they go 
there and relax.” 
  
The term “our mentalitet” as used by my respondents usually refers to a measure of conformity 
to the Azeri norms and traditions. Despite their chances of travel, Le-18 and Le-16 have 
remained very much attached to the rigid, conservative gender norms, with which they were 
brought up. It can be partly explained by the fact that they are of lower income and social status 
groups, and have less access to academic discourse and/or Western media. These respondents are 
very resistant to the idea of change of the existing cultural norms, and critical about Western 
values. Some part of professional Azeri youth also displays strong dedication to the conservative 
cultural norms and mentalitet. For instance, concerning the youth studying abroad, like the 
majority of the respondents, Le-15 (male, 27) assumes:  
 
“It is not bad to study abroad, but not always good news reaches our ears about the boys and girls 
studying abroad. To say openly, if we go abroad, leave our positive features there and bring back 
their negatives, then we do not need this; it is better not to go abroad then. What should we 
acquire from Europe? These are honesty, correctness and freedom of expression, and accuracy in 
their works. As to morality, our morality and mentalitet are very high. There is no necessity to 
acquire and bring their morality here.” 
 
The respondents‟ worries about mentalitet regardless of their professionalism and locality 
reminds Inglehart‟s authoritarian reflex. Here it is observed in the form of “fundamentalist or 
nativist reactions” – “the reaction to change takes the form of a rejection of the new, and a 
compulsive insistence on the infallibility of old, familiar cultural patterns”.70 Obstacles to 
eradicating the gender stereotypes are assumed to relate to the ethno-psychology and mentality 
of the Azeri society.
71
  
  
In the meantime, the ruling party YAP maintains the status-quo of our mentalitet in practice 
through its members‟ attitudes. For instance, Le-11, male, 34, was born in Yardimli, lives and 
works in Lenkaran town. He holds PhD in agriculture and is a YAP member. Thanks to his 
employment with a foreign NGO based in Lenkaran, he traveled a great deal to Western and 
Eastern Europe. He is critical about Europeanization, and supports the existing gender attitudes 
and rule of elders, even though it is not explicit whether he really means all this or is just 
confirming the “official” voice:  
 
“No, no, I would not call them (confines imposed on womenfolk by males) restrictions. 
Unfortunately, some things are misrepresented in our country. If anyone sees something in 
Europe s/he wants us to be like that. A European cannot be like us even if s/he wants today. Every 
nation has own peculiarities as well as high features. Of course every tradition should be evolving 
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too. Our Azerbaijan, in general Turkic world has traditions such as the elder has elder‟s place and 
the younger has younger‟s place (böyüyün böyük yeri var, kiçiyin kiçik); we have always learned 
from the elders, they have always given advice to the youth”.  
 
Traditional/ethnic Azeri cultural norms are strongly adhered to and referred to as mentalitet, 
which is also a Soviet legacy, among young and elder people. In general, there is a perception 
that they are coming from our “blood”, and therefore are accepted as something intrinsic and 
inviolable. For instance, Le-11 rejects the probability of his wife‟s travel abroad without asking 
his permission and argues:  
 
“No, you know, we are Azerbaijanis. One cannot change our blood. These are pillars of the strong 
Azerbaijani family. Nobody can destroy them. It is not acceptable”.    
 
His membership of the ruling party can explain Le-11‟s strong adherence to the idea of 
Azerbaijanism, which is connected with the late President and YAP founder Heydar Aliyev, and, 
as a part of the ruling party ideology, comprises adulation of the national Azeri traditions and 
moral values.
72
 H. Aliyev was for the secular state, but against secularization of culture.73 
Generally, it is a tendency observed in the socio-political life of the Republic not only among the 
pro-governmental youth but also elders. An opinion by Zelimkhan Yagub, a popular poet and 
MP from the ruling party is indicative of this tendency: “I think that why one should avoid one‟s 
way but follow others? Shows, soap operas, disgusting speeches, revealing garments, which one 
shall I remind, my child?! Hey you, stop, look back and see what you do have in your treasury. 
Hey people, where are you going? We are Azerbaijanis. They say let us become Europeanized. 
No. Let us become Azerbaijanianized. Let us not bring disgusting processes going on in Europe 
and dishonourable “novelties” stretching till the bed to Azerbaijan, and not make this nation 
unhappy”.74 
 
In opposition to the above position, Hikmet Hajizade from the Musavat Party and one of the 
translators of Robert Dahl‟s “On Democracy” into Azeri argues: “National Azeri values were 
formed in the Middle Ages, and as one can see have undergone so little changes since then. The 
backbone of Azeri moral rules, often referred to as Turkic-Muslim, was formed under the 
influence of medieval Turkic military-feudal code of honour. … Therefore, we can conclude that 
our contemporary values are not “national”, but “patriarchal” and “archaic”. It is obvious that 
they are not compatible with the requirements of modernity”.75  
   
The split around the national Azeri traditions and cultural norms can be simultaneously observed 
among the pro-governmental and opposition youth organizations. Orxan Arabov, Head of 
Humanitarian Department of National Assembly of Youth Organizations of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan (NAYORA) notes: “Our duties also include advocating patriotism, our national 
moral and cultural values. We have very rich culture and historical roots. But, if there are certain 
foreign elements that can provide with positive development and can help our people, then we 
can benefit from them. However, I am certainly far from the idea of copying directly and 
deleting our culture completely. We can add something to our culture both from the Western and 
Eastern cultures, but by preserving our identity”.76  
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Meanwhile, Araz Gasimov, acting chairman of Dalgha Youth Movement (DYM) labels 
mentalitet as one of the three fundamental problems (together with illiteracy and religion) of the 
Azeri society. He argues that some mental values hinder from establishing open society and 
permeating new secular values, but are more supportive of the domination of feudal 
environment.
77
 The DYM was established on February 12, 2005 by 7 students of the Economic 
University.
78
 Since then they have launched a number of campaigns against corruption in 
education system, gender inequality, repressions to free press, violations of human rights, etc. Its 
emblem – two open angled triangles means free individual and free society.  
 
The next sub-section demonstrates that there is regional variation in Azeri gender and inter-
generational relations. However, it is not as simple as being Baku and outside of Baku, but there 
is also a similar division within Baku.   
 
 
Metropolitan-Periphery Differences in Gender and Intergenerational Relations  
 
This research was carried out in Baku and Lenkaran to display regional varieties. They both 
stretch out on the coast of the Caspian Sea. With its abundant hydro-carbon reserves Baku has 
been attracting investments and a wide range of local and foreign professional employees since 
the late 19
th
 century. The Baku population consisted of Azerbaijanis (36%), Russians and 
Ukrainians (35%), Armenians (17%), Transcaucasian and Northern Caucasian people, Southern 
Azeris, Jews and Europeans at the turn of the century.
79
 Besides, many non-Azerbaijanis 
continued inhabiting Baku during the Soviet time, whereas immigration of Azeris from 
peripheries to Baku was limited under strict registration policy. Niyazi Mehdi considers that on 
the basis of Russian education, Azerbaijanis, Jews, Russians, Armenians, etc. of Baku created 
so-called “the nation of Bakuvians” (“нация бакинцев” in Russian), a sub-culture which was 
essentially different from Russian culture.
80
 This cosmopolitan sub-culture was also different 
from ethnic Azeris by their manners and lifestyle and they held high positions in the Azeri 
society.    
 
However, even Russian speaking Azeris were not able to challenge the rigid gender norms since 
tangible chadra (veil) was replaced with virtual chadra in the society; and some Soviet-Azeri 
parents let their sons learn Russian, while depriving their daughters from this opportunity due to 
the principle of “honour”.81 Under this principle, which remains valid nowadays, requirements 
for chastity, especially virginity were similarly applied to the elite and rural females. For 
example, according to one survey, nearly 99% of women were virgins at marriage and 98% of 
them have had only one sexual partner.
82
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After the 1991 independence, as a result of the war with Armenia, many non-Azerbaijanis 
inhabiting Baku left for abroad and Azeris from the occupied regions fled for Baku. In addition, 
a lot of Azeris for the pursuit of employment and better life options have moved to Baku from 
peripheries in the last years. Socialization and assimilation of provincial newcomers in the city 
do not happen overnight. They bring stricter cultural norms as well as gender attitudes with them 
and usually because of the lack of communication with urban population live within closed 
circles of their relatives and/or countrymen. It is therefore significant to take the abovementioned 
nuances into account in juxtaposition of urban and rural culture among the Azeri youth.  
 
Moreover, a cursory glance over Baku architecture reveals the existence of neighborhood 
communities (mahalla) known as Yasamal, Shamakhinka, Kubinka, Papanin, Sovetski, etc. 
among the people (their Russian names were changed during the years of independence). The 
architectural design of these mahallas, country style houses and villas, has fostered 
communalism and regionalism versus urbanism in the center of Baku for many years, and 
hindered its acquisition of a true urban spirit. For example, native inhabitants used to live mainly 
in Sovetski, while newcomers in Shamakhinka (literally place where comers from Shamakhi 
lived) or in Kubinka (comers from Guba). One can visualize the mahalla features in Yasamal, 
where a highway separates administrative unit of Yasamal into two parts: one consists of typical 
old style houses with flat roofs and the other – apartment blocks.  
 
For example, Ba-20 (male, 31) lives in the old part of Yasamal. Despite the existence of Baku 
State University in the vicinity he, like the majority of the Yasamalians, did not wish to study. 
Concerning study he says:  
 
“In general institute (any higher educational institution) was considered badly in the past, for 
example the girls studying at institute were not regarded well. As I told before many families 
from Yasamal did not allow their daughters to go to school after the 8
th
 class. As to institute it 
was considered badly, but for boys it was ok”.  
 
Ba-04, female, 18, was born and lives on the other side of Yasamal. She studies part-time at the 
University of Economics and works in her free time. Her grandparents are teachers and parents 
are accountants. She attended Russian sector at school, thinks and dresses more openly than the 
youth on the old part of Yasamal. However, owing to the ongoing influxes, the overall social 
environment between the two Yasamals now differs little.  
 
Ba-04 says: “They look at me strangely when they see my short skirt; or wonder why I am with a 
boy or why I enter in the mahalla in a boy‟s car. My mahalla guys tell me “Why you are like 
this? It is not a right behavior. You demean us in front of that boy. You do not respect us.” I 
answer “What is it to say? Is it your mahalla? I live in this mahalla. I come and that‟s it.” Even 
the boy who drives me in the car hesitates “Better if I do not drive in the mahalla, it is not right”; 
I say “No, you will drive in”. And the elderly neighboring women sitting in front of the block 
look at me disapprovingly. I know they gossip about me. They have adapted to the society and 
afraid of acting like me because people can turn from them. They look at me with disdain. So 
what? It is my own business. If anyone does something s/he does not tell me. It is her/his own 
life, own business.”  
 
On the other hand, Lenkaran served as a southern fortress both to the Russian Empire and Soviet 
Union on the border with Iran. Native Russians were moved to Lenkaran and its neighborhoods, 
and Russian settlements were established here starting from the second half of the 19
th
 century. 
However, the degree of Europeanization among Azeris through Russification in Lenkaran never 
reached that of Baku given strong religiousness of the region and less Western involvement. On 
the contrary, in the contact with the local population Lenkarani Russians partly adapted to the 
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local customs. After the independence, many of them left for Russia, or other places for better 
life options.  
  
Being situated between the Caspian Sea and the Talish Mountains Lenkaran enjoys a rich nature 
with sub-tropical climate that makes it a great place for relaxation and tourism. But conservative-
puritanical gender norms and customs have led to segregation of public places and dull dynamics 
of secular lifestyle in the town that once was lively and colorful with the presence of Russians.  
 
Le-17 (female, 27) says: “My father recalls that Russians were decorations of Gala (the central of 
Lenkaran town). In the past we had theatres and cinema here. After work Russian couples used to 
walk in the park, nicely dressed, hand in hand, and go to the theater or cinema. But now when our 
Azeri relatives go out husband says to the wife “I go in front, you follow me”. By now we do not 
have a culture that husband and wife go side by side and hand in hand. Some men really do not 
like it; they either send their wives by car or they walk by keeping distance. When an Azeri 
couple goes to wedding party, husband goes and sits at men‟s side and wife at women‟s side. So, 
the party is divided into male and female sides.”  
 
Azeri gender norms require couples not to display signs of physical affection in public and in 
front of the elders. It is also very rare to notice any female driver in the town which was the case 
in Baku several years ago. Females, including wives usually sit in the back seat but not in front 
next to driving menfolk, especially husband. Business meetings and events in the town are 
normally organized daytime so that females can join. In such meetings and events males and 
females have to observe distance.  
 
Le-03 (female, 31) observes: “Let us say we go to a meeting at the Executive Apparatus. If a man 
sits on a bench in the row, a female will leave one empty seat and sit in the next one. Men also try 
to be careful because the woman may be married and this might create a problem for her family. 
So if she does not sit next to me, the man thinks, I should not sit next to her either. But if a female 
sits next to him, then the man is not afraid of. He thinks she is a normal person with normal 
thinking.”  
 
There is a lack of female presence on the streets after dusk in Lenkaran, which can be also 
observed in Baku though to a lesser extent. Females‟ mobility is restricted in the Azeri society 
since home is considered to be a female domain. This Azeri “normality” is one of the 
abnormalities that first strike Western visitors in the country. For example, Kate, female, 28, is 
from the US and lived with a host family (consisting parents, a son and a daughter) in Baku in 
2008 for several months. She remarks:  
 
“Living with that family made it very clear that women in the family do not leave house very 
much like if they go out they would visit their family, like aunts, etc.; besides, specific things to 
do like to buy a new pair of shoes or to go to a wedding party they didn‟t just go out very much 
and not very much like social stuff, whereas the men in the family were not at home really so 
much. It is like very clearly: women in the society stay at home and men go out. That is insane. 
Even as a foreigner I realize it is different from me and this is also one reason why I decided not 
to continue living with this family. But just walking down the street if you are out after 7 or 8 
o‟clock at night 4 or 5 people that you have around are men. It is just so uncomfortable 
sometimes. I was taking the bus to home, actually after having dinner with my host family and I 
was the only woman on the bus. It was 9.30 at night, it was not very late. It is funny when you are 
out at 10 o‟clock at night as a woman walking around, I do not feel unsafe, it is not the issue; that 
is not like I am holding my purse, looking around; I just feel uncomfortable.”  
 
In Lenkaran young females usually do not attend public events which are always crowded with 
males. Since my fieldtrip coincided with the Nowruz Bayrami (spring holiday) I had a chance to 
attend the holiday concert organized in the town park. It started at 9 pm and one could see 
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mainly young males around. If there were any young females they were accompanied by their 
family members, like Le-06 (female, 20), who thinks she is even in a better situation than many 
other of her peers.  
  
She says: “My neighbors‟ daughters left school after the 4th form or 9th and sit at home. I am 
different from them in a way that I have a secondary school leaving certificate, I study part-time 
at the university, I work, and I join events organized by local Women‟s Organization. When there 
are concerts in the park those girls do not come saying that “No, what is there to do? I am sitting 
at home. Its sound reaches our yard anyway”. I attended the concert organized for the occasion of 
the Nowruz Holiday. Father took us – me, mum and my brother.”  
  
Football stadium, chaykhanas (tea houses) and beaches are strictly gender segregated places in 
Lenkaran town. The town has own football team (Khazar-Lenkaran) and a newly built spacious 
stadium. I attended one of its matches together with one of my male respondents who warned me 
to be ready to hear swearing if their team loses; fortunately it won. The stadium was full of males 
of different age except for the wives of a few foreign players of the local team.   
 
Another example of gender segregation is chaykhana which is not a case only for Lenkaran but 
also Baku and throughout Azerbaijan. Due to her observations in Baku, Heyat remarks: “The 
strong identification of tea/coffee houses as male spaces is a feature of social life in many areas 
of the Mediterranean and the Middle East where there is also a prevailing social discourse of 
male superiority and female subordination. But here, in a communist society with its official 
emphasis on gender equality in public life, I had somehow not expected their presence”.83   
 
Last but not least, one of the most gender segregated places in Lenkaran is its beaches on the 
seacoast. Neither over 70 years of Sovietization, nor the presence of Russians with their more 
open culture has left any significant influence on this issue. The closest beach to the town at 
Sutomurdov (a settlement adjacent to the town) is divided into men‟s and women‟s sides by 
natural canes. On the other hand, Lenkaranis prefer to go with their families to distant places 
where they may ignore alien eyes. In both cases women do not wear swimming costumes but go 
in the water in their casual dresses, and young especially unmarried females do not join. By 
driving or going away, Lenkarani males consider they respect other men when they see them on 
the seacoast with their womenfolk.   
 
Le-14 (20) says: “The youth go to the beach, but male part. I am personally against this completely. 
Why there are no opportunities for females? This is factually violation of their rights. They sit at 
home and see that dad and brother go to the beach. They also wish to go but it is impossible. Why? 
Not because brother does not allow this, not because perhaps father does not allow, but because there 
is a public censure (ictimai qınaq). Families do not take (adult) daughters to swim in the sea, only 
girls by the age of 6-7 are allowed. Or elderly women go to the female part of the seacoast, but they 
do not wear modern swimming costume.” 
 
Le-14 is aware of alternative lifestyles and criticizes inequality faced by young females. 
However, he belongs to a society whose censure he is not able to confront alone. On the other 
hand, apparently he has not fully internalized the alternative views yet and is not consistent in his 
behavior. 19 year old Le-09, a female student shares her observation about Le-14:  
 
“He organized an event last summer. It started at 7 pm. His sister called his mobile and asked 
whether she should come. He told: “No, you should not come”. What is this to say? It means we 
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are bad that we came here but your sister is clever and stayed at home? There are things like this 
– they (males) ask others to do things which they would not permit their female relatives. He 
behaves as if he is my friend, he likes me very much, etc. So, if you are my friend, why your 
sister does not attend? Let her come, too!”  
 
Young males, for instance, like Le-11, Le-14, Le-15, who have decided to make careers in local 
community usually try to show conformity in the delicate issues such as gender norms in order to 
pursue their careers smoothly, rather than challenging them. And since these norms do not 
restrict males‟ social mobility and do grant them more freedom than females they are more 
comfortable with them. Hence, they do not challenge them; as such they maintain the social 
order in Azeri society, with its authoritarian and undemocratic features.  
 
 
6. Conclusion and Recommendations  
 
This research has examined the contemporary youth gender and intergenerational relations in 
Azerbaijan. Its findings confirm that gendered patterns of behavior with their strict limitations 
posed on females and greater freedom granted for the males are instilled in the young from early 
childhood. Furthermore, strong emphasis on deference to the elders is cultivated through early 
socialization.  
 
Gender relations in the ethnic Azeri culture are based on the codes of namus, qeyrət and ayıb, 
which restrict female physical mobility for the sake of control of “female honour”. In turn, the 
latter leads to lack of opportunities to develop one‟s individuality and enjoy personal rights. 
Broadly speaking, it hinders females‟ social mobility, their freedom of association and 
opportunities for their personal and social development. As a consequence of this, we do not hear 
voices of young females as often as that of the males.  
 
Another consequence of observing the ethnic Azeri moral codes of behavior has been to 
segregate public places and discriminate against social activity of females. This is particularly 
the case in Lenkaran region, where public presence of females is greatly limited. Limitations on 
the girls‟ and young females‟ mobility and prevailing inhibitions regarding their education and 
training lead to their lack of social skills, self-confidence, and generally low self-esteem. All this, 
contributes to their low degree of involvement in the economy and political life. However, young 
Azeri females, regardless of their level of education and locality, seem to be more progressive in 
their social attitudes than the males. This may be partly explained by the fact that they directly 
face the consequences of the unequal gender relations and often exposed to exploitation within 
the family and beyond. 
 
Expectations of Azeri masculinity and femininity (discussed in section 3) favor male-dependant 
females rather than independent and mature individuals with initiative and opinion, who are free 
in making decisions and acting on their own. Female obedience to male authority in the parental 
home reproduces the wife‟s subordination to her husband and his elders in married life, and 
female employees‟ subordination to male boss and elderly employees at work, and female 
citizens‟ submissiveness to authorities in public. 
 
Azeri society, in general, considers marriage and child-bearing as ultimate goals of young 
females. This very often overshadows the young women‟s career wishes and plans for education 
and employment. This, in turn, leads to women handing over power within the family to their 
menfolk, which in turn leads to low levels of female participation in decision making in social 
life. Consequently, as poorly trained and educated, and submissive females they tend to become 
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vulnerable to manipulation and propaganda on social issues. An example of this is the way many 
young women follow the voting preferences of their menfolk in the elections.  
 
Moreover, gender relations in the ethnic Azeri culture require male protection of female honour, 
which translates into male accompaniment and control of their female folk. This in turn both 
distracts males from their own plans and makes them vulnerable to peer and the community 
pressure in cases of nonconformity.   
 
The Azeri youth intergenerational relations are based on the cultural/conventional norm of 
respect for elders, which perpetuates rule of elders versus rule of law in a country with one of the 
highest corruption rates in the world.
84
 Respect for elders and traditional-cultural norms further 
disempower youth. The notion of respect turns into a mechanism of control and suppression. In 
practice, it manifests itself in the form of positive discrimination in favor of elders and the 
elders‟ expectations of obedience by the younger. The latter is highly undemocratic in a way: (1) 
It does not allow merit-based competition among different age cohorts and discourage the youth 
self-expression and initiative; (2) It leads to the youth dependence on the elders and instills 
submissiveness in them; and (3) This mini model of power relations in the family reproduces the 
authoritarian/hierarchal relations in the society.  
 
“In the political realm, the rise of Postmodern values brings declining respect for authority, and 
growing emphasis on participation and self-expression. These two trends are conducive to 
democratization (in authoritarian societies) and to more participatory, issue-oriented democracy 
(in already democratic societies).”85 The systems of Azeri youth gender and intergenerational 
relations generate deference to authority of males and elders in the family, and in the society at 
large. These features of Azeri culture are not postmodern and thus not compatible with 
democratization.   
 
Another trend observed among the today‟s Azeri youth is that young members of the ruling party 
YAP are more conservative in maintenance of the patriarchal-authoritarian cultural norms than 
neutral and oppositionist youth. It can be explained with the fact that (1) adherence to those 
norms is associated with respect for the late party leader and authoritarian figure H. Aliyev; (2) 
being a member of the ruling party facilitates career development of those youth. In the 
meantime, the Azeri youth are mostly not politicized, especially females. It can be observed in 
their absenteeism in nationwide political events such as the recent referendum and non-
participation in civil society organizations.  
 
In the context of the above-described overall picture, the present composition of Azeri youth 
attitudes to gender and authority can be characterized as a pastiche of traditional, modern and 
postmodern patterns. However, the majority conform to the traditional way of thinking. The 
personal examples of the respondents of this research demonstrate that the contemporary Azeri 
youth vary according to their education, social status and locality. In Baku, historically a 
cosmopolitan environment, because of prevalence of foreign residents and greatly diminished 
neighborhood surveillance system, which existed in the Soviet time, and influx of regional 
population to Baku, there is a greater degree of anonymity coupled with a greater access to the 
internet, and individual liberty for young males and females than in the regions. In contrast, 
Lenkaran is a more closed society with far stricter observance of the traditional norms and 
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restrictions on female comportment and male-female relations. Hence, there is far less 
opportunities for individual liberty, which reinforces the gender and intergenerational inequality, 
and male-biased gender norms.    
There is a shift from traditionalism to liberalism among younger generation, which reflects a 
widening intergenerational gap between the youth and elders. A small number of liberal-
democratic Azeri youth exposed to the influence of the West through study abroad and close 
contact with international NGOs in the country contrasts with the majority of the youth being 
traditional /conservative and close to the generation of their parents. Western NGOs act as agents 
of social change. The lack of European involvement would retard the further liberalization of 
gender and intergenerational relations.  
The followings would help to combat with undemocratic nature of the existing youth gender and 
intergenerational relations in Azerbaijan:  
 
1. Redefinition of the ethnic/cultural notions of namus and qeyrət. For example, in Turkey 
through the campaigns by women‟s movement and in order to facilitate entry to EU, 
Turkish Parliament agreed to redraw the 1926 Penal Code in 2004 to eliminate gender 
biased moral terms. The old Penal Code was full of traditional concepts adapted from 
Arabic such as irz (honour or purity), haya (shame) and ar (things to be ashamed of), and 
treated women‟s sexuality as a threat that needed to be controlled by society.86 In 
Azerbaijan similarly it would be useful to have campaign around the redefinition of the 
mentioned omnipresent notions.   
 
2. Sex and gender education at secondary schools to develop rational understanding of and 
informed attitude towards human body, biological needs and unbiased, constructive and 
healthy relations between boys and girls;  
 
3. Economic empowerment of the youth through job creation with decent salary and 
facilitating independent housing conditions for the young through favorable mortgage 
programs and expanded rental market in order to weaken their familial dependence and 
develop individual agency; 
 
4. Encouragement of portrayal of liberal gender and intergenerational attitudes in the media 
through TV programs, public discussion forums, etc.  
 
5. Review of school and university textbooks, syllabuses and educational programs, with 
the view to reduce gender inequality and increase students‟ /young people‟s agency.  
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Table 01 In-Depth Interviewee Characteristics  
 
Code Name Gender Age 
Current 
Residence 
Generational Status 
at the Current 
Residence  
Education Occupation 
Current Organizational 
Membership 
Marital 
Status  
Lives  with 
Ba-01 F 31 Baku Newcomer High Teacher at a university Professional Single  Extended family  
Ba-02 M 33 Baku Newcomer Secondary school Driver None  Married  Own nuclear family 
Ba-03 F 34 Baku Newcomer High  Journalist  Professional  Single  Siblings  
Ba-04 F 18 Baku Native inhabitant Studying at university Seller in a cosmetics shop None  Single  Parental family  
Ba-05 M 30 Baku Native inhabitant  High  Serves in army Professional  Single  Parental family 
Ba-06 M 25 Baku 1
st
 generation Secondary school  Self-employed mason  None  Single  Parental family 
Ba-07 M  27 Baku  Newcomer High  Controller at a gas maintenance 
department 
None  Married Own nuclear family 
Ba-08 F  21 Baku  1
st
 generation Secondary school Seller in a women‟s dress shop  None  Single  Parental family 
Ba-09 M  27 Baku  Newcomer High  Teacher at a university  Professional  Single  Parental family 
Ba-10 F 30 Baku  1
st
 generation 
 
Incomplete secondary  
school  
Seller in a mechanic equipment 
shop 
None  Divorced  Parental family 
Ba-11 M  23 Baku  1
st
 generation High  Credit specialist in a bank Sports  Single  Parental family 
Ba-12 M  21 Baku  Newcomer Secondary school Seller in a carpet shop None  Single  Parental family 
Ba-13 F  29 Baku  Newcomer High  Teacher at a college None  Single  Sibling  
Ba-14 F  25 Baku  1
st
 generation Secondary school Ticket seller at a theater  None  Married  Extended family 
Ba-15 F  29 Baku  Native inhabitant  High  Advisor at the Ministry of 
Communication & Technology 
Educational  Single  Parental family 
Ba-16 F  19 Baku  Newcomer Incomplete secondary  
school 
Unemployed  None  Single  Parental family 
Ba-17 M  26 Baku  2
nd
 generation Secondary school Seasonal trade worker  None  Single  Alone  
(parents died) 
Ba-18 F  23 Baku  1
st
 generation High  Laboratory assistant at a steel 
factory 
None  Single  Parental family  
Ba-19 M  32 Baku  1
st
 generation  High  Lawyer in a foreign banking 
company 
Professional  Engaged  Parental family 
Ba-20 M 31 Baku  1
st
 generation Secondary school Shoemaker  None  Married  Extended family  
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Code Name Gender Age 
Current 
Residence 
Generational Status 
at the Current 
Residence  
Education Occupation 
Current Organizational 
Membership 
Marital 
Status  
Lives  with 
Le-01 M 21 Lenkaran Newcomer  Studying at university Part-time journalist  Youth org. Single  Roommates  
Le-02 F 21 Lenkaran Newcomer  Secondary school Assistant in a photo shop None  Single  Parental family 
Le-03 F  31 Lenkaran  Native inhabitant High  Teacher at a secondary school  Political party & 
professional 
Married  Extended family 
Le-04 M 28 Lenkaran  Native inhabitant High  Head of the branch of an 
international NGO 
Political party & 
professional  
Single  Parental family 
Le-05 F  26 Lenkaran  Native inhabitant High  Lawyer at a university None  Single  Parental family 
Le-06 F  20 Lenkaran  Native inhabitant High  Teacher at a secondary school None  Single  Parental family 
Le-07 M  22 Lenkaran Native inhabitant Secondary school Driver  Sports  Single  Parental family 
Le-08 F 23 Lenkaran Native inhabitant High  Coordinator at a library None  Single  Parental family 
Le-09 F  19 Baku   Native inhabitant Studying at university Assistant at a chemist‟s Youth org. Single  Roommates  
Le-10 F  25 Lenkaran  Newcomer  High  Teacher at a secondary school Educational  Single  Parental family 
Le-11 M  34 Lenkaran  Newcomer  High  Coordinator of an agricultural 
project  
Political party Married  Own nuclear family 
Le-12 M 27 Lenkaran Newcomer  High  Head of an NGO Political party & 
professional 
Married  Own nuclear family 
Le-13 F 21 Lenkaran  Native inhabitant Secondary school Administrator at a hotel None  Engaged  Parental family 
Le-14 M  20 Lenkaran  Native inhabitant  Studying at university Youth organization volunteer  Youth org. Single  Parental family 
Le-15 M  27 Lenkaran  Native inhabitant High  Adult education teacher Political party  Single  Parental family 
Le-16 M  25 Lenkaran  Native inhabitant Secondary school Seller in a shoe shop None  Single  Parental family 
Le-17 F  27 Lenkaran  Native inhabitant Secondary school Assistant at a chemist‟s Women org.  Single  Parental family 
Le-18 M 30 Lenkaran Newcomer  Secondary school Unemployed (before security 
administrator a transportation 
agency) 
None  Single  Extended family 
Le-19 F  32 Lenkaran  Native inhabitant Secondary school Housewife  None  Married  Own nuclear family 
Le-20 M  26 Lenkaran  Native inhabitant High  Coordinator at Lenkaran 
Executive Power   
Political party Single  Parental family 
 
 
 
 
